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1 Introduction
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is the single most important factor accounting for the large
cross-country income differences we see in the data (Hsieh and Klenow, 2010; Caselli, 2005;
Hall and Jones, 1999; Klenow and Rodr´ıguez-Clare, 1997). We evaluate the role of financial
frictions as a source of TFP differences. The key friction is that entrepreneurs face a collateral
constraint when raising business capital. Our main contribution is to consider the role of
entrepreneurial schooling decisions, and how they interact with financial frictions.
We view entrepreneurial human capital as a main determinant of firm-level productiv-
ity. That is, more educated entrepreneurs are better managers, and therefore operate more
productive businesses. In this setting, future entrepreneurs under-invest in schooling in an-
ticipation of the presence of credit frictions. They do so because investing in schooling is
not very productive in small-sized firms, and also because the opportunity cost of schooling
investments is high when resources could be used instead to build up collateral. Intuitively,
entrepreneurs don’t invest much in education since they realize they will be running a small
family business; they prefer instead to work hard in order to save more. Further, schooling
investments get misallocated. That is, those entrepreneurs with the best productivity poten-
tial are the ones who feel compelled to reduce schooling investments the most. We find that
these two effects, schooling under-investment and schooling misallocation, play an important
quantitative role in accounting for the U.S.-India TFP differences.
Our model integrates two literatures/frameworks. One is a model of entrepreneurship
with credit constraints, along the lines of Buera and Shin (2013), Buera et al. (2011) and
Midrigan and Xu (2014), among others.1 The other is a model of human capital accumulation
along the lines of Erosa et al. (2010) and Manuelli and Seshadri (2014).
Like in the existing literature on entrepreneurship with credit constraints, financial fric-
tions generate a misallocation of talent into occupations. Namely, poor individuals talented
at entrepreneurship choose to become workers, since their firms would operate at an ineffi-
ciently small scale. Other individuals, not so talented at managing and operating a produc-
tion technology, find it advantageous to do so if sufficiently wealthy. Further, capital gets
1Other references include Castro et al. (2004, 2009), Erosa and Hidalgo-Cabrillana (2008), Amaral and
Quintin (2010), Buera et al. (2011), Greenwood et al. (2013), Moll (2014), and Moll et al. (2014).
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misallocated among those individuals that do decide to become entrepreneurs. This is be-
cause with credit constraints firm size depends on entrepreneurial wealth, not just firm-level
productivities. On top of these well-understood effects of credit constraints, our framework
generates additional ones, stemming from changes in entrepreneurial schooling choices and in
the distribution of firm-level productivities. A key feature of our setup is precisely that the
distribution of firm-level productivities becomes endogenous, determined by entrepreneurial-
level schooling decisions.
We quantify the role of these different effects of credit frictions on TFP. In line with the
previous literature, we first calibrate our model to the U.S. and consider a scenario where
the only fundamental difference between the U.S. and India is the overall degree of financial
frictions. In this case, our model accounts for about 1/5 of the U.S.-India TFP difference.
Capital misallocation is responsible for roughly half of this difference. The other half comes
mostly from the misallocation of entrepreneurial schooling investments. A second calibration
also lets the average productivity of the human capital accumulation technology vary across
the U.S. and India in order to match the average years of schooling differences across these
two countries. This results in a significant amplification of the effect of frictions, and in this
case the model is able to account for 58% of the TFP difference.
Our modelling of schooling decisions follows Erosa et al. (2010) and Manuelli and Seshadri
(2014). These papers emphasize the role of cross-country TFP differences. Our model shares
with these papers the feature that, in addition to time, expenditure in goods (or education
quality) is also a key input into the human capital accumulation process. As in these papers,
the education quality margin in our model leads workers to invest less in education in coun-
tries with lower wages (due to tighter credit frictions). In our paper, however, credit frictions
also discourage schooling investments among entrepreneurs, by reducing the marginal return
to those investments. The latter mechanism is independent from presence of an education
quality margin in the human capital accumulation process.2
Bhattacharya et al. (2013) also consider entrepreneurial investment in managerial skills, in
2There is an extensive literature on educational decisions under credit constraints. An early example
is Galor and Zeira (1993), and more recent developments are in Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011) and
Co´rdoba and Ripoll (2013). As in these papers, credit constraints in our model act as a direct mechanism
lowering education, namely among poorer individuals. However, the central role of credit constraints in our
model will be in affecting entrepreneurial, not worker, schooling decisions.
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a setting with exogenously given distortions in firm size. As in their paper, the distribution of
firm-level productivities in our model arises endogenously from entrepreneurial investments in
human capital. In contrast to their framework, firm size distortions are endogenous here, and
depend on the wealth distribution. In our model, constrained entrepreneurs under-invest in
schooling in part in order to self-finance. This mitigates physical capital misallocation across
firms, a mechanism also emphasized by Midrigan and Xu (2014). Another difference is
that, in our model, human capital investments are also a determinant of occupational choice
decisions. The extent of under-investment in human capital by constrained entrepreneurs is
therefore bounded by their willingness to switch occupation.
Finally, our paper is also related to the resource misallocation literature, namely Restuccia
and Rogerson (2008), Hsieh and Klenow (2009), and Bartelsman et al. (2013). These authors
examine the aggregate productivity consequences of misallocation generated by firm-specific
taxes and subsidies. These taxes and subsidies are effectively stand-in, generic distortions,
meant to capture deeper allocative problems. Our model concentrates on one such allocative
problem: malfunctioning credit markets. We provide an explicit mapping between funda-
mental distortions coming out of our model, and the stand-in taxes and subsidies that are
typically considered in this literature. We also extend Hsieh and Klenow’s (2009) framework
for measuring the extent of resource misallocation. In our case, in addition to distortions to
cross-firm input allocation, there are also distortions to physical productivity relative to the
frictionless benchmark. The latter are induced by talent misallocation and by distortions to
entrepreneurial schooling investments. We find a significant quantitative role for the latter.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyzes the
optimality conditions. Section 4 describes the calibration procedure. Section 5 presents the
results, and Section 6 concludes. The Appendices contain detailed information about some
of the analytical properties of the model, the mapping between model and data, and the
numerical procedure.
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2 Model
2.1 The Environment
Consider an economy with measure one of altruistic dynasties. Each individual lives for 2
periods, childhood and adulthood. The household, composed of a child and an adult parent,
is the decision unit, as if a household planner existed which pooled all household member
resources and coordinated all the decisions. We call childhood the period when schooling
and investment decisions are made, and adulthood the period when the individual’s main
economic activity is carried out.
Households value stochastic aggregate household consumption streams according to
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct) . (1)
The period utility function u is of class C2, is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satisfies
the usual Inada conditions.
In anticipation of our recursive formulation, we use primes to denote variables which
pertain to the next generation, whereas those without primes refer to the current one. The
household starts the period with wealth ω, and a draw of the child’s abilities, current learning
ability z and future entrepreneurial ability x. The inter-generational ability transmission is
governed by a first-order Markov chain with transition probabilities pi (z′, x′|z, x).
Given the current state (ω, z, x), the household makes four decisions. First, it decides
today’s investment in the child’s education, by choosing years schooling s and schooling
expenditures e to produce human capital according to
h = z
(
sηe1−η
)ξ
, (2)
with η ∈ [0, 1] and ξ ∈ [0, 1).3 We follow Erosa et al. (2010) and Manuelli and Seshadri (2014)
3A more general formulation would be h = z
(
sηe1−η
)ξ
h¯ζ0 + (1− µ) h¯0, where h¯0 is the child’s initial
human capital. Here we assume full depreciation (µ = 1), similarly to Erosa et al. (2010). The component
h¯ζ0 is captured by mean learning ability in our specification. Intergenerational transmission of human capital
is therefore governed by the persistence in learning ability.
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in considering private expenditures as an input to human capital accumulation in addition
to student time. This allows a worker’s schooling time to increase with wages. With the
presence of private expenditures, higher wages increase the marginal gain from schooling
investments by more than the marginal cost, since the price of the goods input is invariant
to the wage.4
Second, the household decides today’s saving for next period, by purchasing bonds in net
amount q at unit price 1/(1 + r).5 Third, it decides the child’s occupation for next period,
whether to become an entrepreneur or a worker. Workers supply their human capital at the
going wage rate. Entrepreneurs manage their own firms and are the residual claimants of
profits. Fourth, if the decision is to become an entrepreneur next period then the household
also needs to raise capital, possibly relying in part on external funds, and hire labor in order
to run the firm.
All production is carried out by entrepreneurs according to
y = xhθ
(
kαl1−α
)γ
, (3)
with α, γ, θ ∈ (0, 1), where k and l denote physical capital and labor inputs. Entrepreneurial,
or firm-level productivity is given by xhθ, of which x is determined by luck, and h is the
accumulated human capital. Physical capital depreciates at rate δ ∈ (0, 1).
2.2 Household’s Problem
We focus on stationary equilibria, in which prices and the cross-sectional distribution over
individual states are time-invariant. Denote by w the wage rate (unit price of human capital)
and by r the real interest rate. We begin by formulating the household’s problem conditional
on the child’s occupational choice. It is convenient to consider the occupational choice before
4As in Erosa et al. (2010), this mechanism also relies on the presence of tuition costs, which we also
model. Tuition costs prevent the marginal gains and costs from an additional year of schooling to both vary
proportionally with the current level of human capital, allowing schooling years to vary with both learning
ability z and, via school quality adjustments, wages.
5Given our assumption on the resolution of uncertainty, saving is contingent upon the child’s abilities,
namely next period’s entrepreneurial ability. We abstract from precautionary saving behavior associated with
entrepreneurial ability risk in order to streamline the analysis. This allows us to characterize the household
investment decisions via simple non-arbitrage conditions.
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the remaining decisions. Since all uncertainty is resolved at the start of an individual’s life,
there is no loss in doing so.
Conditional on the child becoming a worker next period, the worker-household ’s problem
can be written recursively as:
vw (ω, z, x) = max
c,e,s,q
{
u (c) + β
∑
z′,x′
pi (z′, x′|z, x) v (ω′, z′, x′)
}
(Pw)
subject to (2) and
c+ wsl¯ + e+
1
1 + r
q = wψh (1− s) + ω (4)
s ≤ s¯ (5)
q ≥ −λφω (6)
ω′ ≡ wh+ q. (7)
Equation (4) is the budget constraint. The term wsl¯+ e is the direct cost of investing in the
child’s education, composed of tuition fees wsl¯ (l¯ is the total teacher input per unit of student
time, which is a parameter) and expenditures in education quality e. Teacher’s effective time
is not an input into human capital production, only student time is. Expenditures in goods
capture direct costs such as books and extracurricular activities. On the right-hand-side,
wψh (1− s) is the child’s labor earnings, where ψ ∈ (0, 1) captures increasing labor earnings
over an individual’s lifetime due to experience accumulation.
Equation (5) is the child’s time constraint (our assumptions on preferences and human
capital technology allow us to ignore the non-negativity constraints on consumption, time,
and schooling expenditures). We impose an upper bound s¯ ≤ 1 for quantitative purposes,
to capture the fact that individuals do not normally spend their entire early life studying.
Households are subject to an inter-period borrowing constraint given by (6). They can
only borrow up to a multiple λφ ≥ 0 of their wealth.6 When φ = 0 no borrowing is
6This constraint can be motivated by a simple static limited enforcement problem. Suppose a household
borrows −q > 0 and then decides whether to default. The only penalty is that financial intermediaries
may seize a fraction ν ∈ [0, 1] of total wealth, including the amount just borrowed. Intermediaries then
require that the gain from defaulting does not exceed the cost, that is −(1 − ν)q ≤ νω. This yields (6)
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allowed, and investment must be completely funded out of the household’s wealth; when
φ =∞ (provided λ > 0, which we assume below) access to credit is unconstrained. Finally,
equation (7) defines the initial wealth of the next household in the dynastic line, conditional
on the fact that next period’s parent will be a worker.
Similarly, conditional on the child becoming an entrepreneur next period, the entrepreneur-
household ’s problem reads:
ve (ω, z, x) = max
c,e,s,q
{
u (c) + β
∑
z′,x′
pi (z′, x′|z, x) v (ω′, z′, x′)
}
(Pe)
subject to (2), (4), (5), (6) and a new definition of household’s wealth which is now based
on entrepreneurial profits
ω′ ≡ Π (q, h, x) + q, (8)
where
Π (q, h, x) = max
k,l≥0
{
xhθ
(
kαl1−α
)γ − (r + δ) k − wl} (Pf)
subject to
k ≤ λq, (9)
with λ ≥ 1. Entrepreneurs hire capital and labor to maximize profits, subject to an intra-
period capital constraint. The maximum level of capital an entrepreneur can use in pro-
duction is given by a multiple λ of the household’s second period wealth, which acts as
collateral.7 When λ = 1 no external funding is allowed, and capital is solely determined by
internal funds. When λ =∞ financial markets work perfectly, and capital is not constrained
by wealth.
with φλ ≡ ν/(1− ν) ≥ 0. The main advantage from using this simple specification is tractability. It shares
with self-enforcing limits based on dynamic incentives (Kehoe and Levine, 1993) the key feature that richer
households are able to borrow more.
7We assume future profits are not pledgable as collateral. Constraint (9) therefore implies that households
that borrow today will not be able to run a firm tomorrow. As a result, only children from sufficiently wealthy
backgrounds can aspire to become entrepreneurs. Similarly to (6), the constraint (9) may be motivated by a
simple static limited enforcement problem. As in Buera and Shin (2013), suppose households borrow k from
financial intermediaries against collateral q, and then have a decision whether to default. The only penalty is
that intermediaries may seize the entire collateral, plus a fraction of κ of k. No default requires (1−κ)k ≤ q,
which yields (9) with λ ≡ 1/(1 − κ) ≥ 1. Related work using identical collateral constraints include Evans
and Jovanovic (1989), Moll (2014) and Moll et al. (2014).
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Financial frictions affect the model via (6) and (9). The parameter λ governs the over-
all extent of financial frictions in the economy, including raising capital by entrepreneurs,
whereas φ is a parameter controlling the relative extent of consumer credit. We choose this
formulation to reflect the possibility that seizing wealth upon default, for example, might be
easier for one type of credit compared to the other. In our quantitative analysis we let λ
vary across countries while fixing φ.
We finally consider the household’s occupational choice for the child next period:
v (ω, z, x) = max {vw (ω, z, x, ) , ve (ω, z, x)} . (10)
2.3 Competitive Equilibrium
Definition. A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is a set of value functions vw (ω, z, x),
ve (ω, z, x), and v (ω, z, x), together with the associated decision rules, a set of entrepreneurial
households B, prices w and r, and an invariant distribution over household states Ψ such
that given prices,
• vw (ω, z, x) and ve (ω, z, x) solve problems (Pw) and (Pe), respectively, and v (ω, z, x)
solves (10),
• the set of entrepreneur-households is defined by the optimal occupational choice rule:
B = {(ω, z, x) ∈ S | ve (ω, z, x) > vw (ω, z, x)} , (11)
where S ⊆ R× R2+ is the individual household’s state space,
• market for labor clears:
∫
B
ldΨ +
∫
S
sl¯dΨ =
∫
S\B
hdΨ +
∫
S
(1− s)ψhdΨ, (12)
• market for capital clears: ∫
B
kdΨ =
∫
S
q
1 + r
dΨ, (13)
9
• market for goods clears:
∫
S
cdΨ +
∫
S
edΨ + δ
∫
B
kdΨ =
∫
B
xhθ
(
kαl1−α
)γ
dΨ, (14)
• distribution Ψ is invariant:
Ψ
(
Sˆ
)
=
∫
S
P
(
X, Sˆ
)
dΨ (X) for all Sˆ ∈ BS, (15)
where P : S × BS → [0, 1] is a transition function generated by the decision rules and
the stochastic processes for z and x, and BS is the Borel σ-algebra of subsets of S.
3 Analysis
In this section we present an analysis of individual optimal decisions. We start with en-
trepreneurial production decisions and proceed by backward induction to schooling and sav-
ings decisions. We finish with the occupational choice.
3.1 Production
Given their human capital, entrepreneurs hire labor and capital to maximize their prof-
its. The presence of the capital constraint implies that the profit function will differ for
constrained and unconstrained entrepreneurs:
Π (q, h, x) =
Π
∗ (h, x) if q ≥ q∗ (h, x) (unconstrained)
Πc (q, h, x) else (constrained),
(16)
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where
q∗ (h, x) = k∗/λ
k∗ =
[
(1− α) (r + δ)1− 1(1−α)γ
αw
](1−α) γ
1−γ (
αγxhθ
) 1
1−γ
l∗ =
(1− α) (r + δ)
αw
k∗
y∗ = xhθ
(
(k∗)α (l∗)1−α
)γ
Π∗ (h, x) = y∗ − wl∗ − (r + δ) k∗
≡ A (xhθ) 11−γ (17)
with A being a function of production function parameters and factor prices, and
kc = max {λq, 0}
lc =
[
γ (1− α) (kc)αγ
w
xhθ
] 1
1−(1−α)γ
yc = xhθ
(
(kc)α (lc)1−α
)γ
Πc (q, h, x) = yc − wlc − (r + δ) kc
≡ B (q) (xhθ) 11−(1−α)γ − (r + δ)λq (18)
with B (q) also a function of production function parameters and factor prices, in addition
to saving.8 The constrained profit function is increasing in accumulated assets since higher
q allows the entrepreneur to raise more capital and increase the scale of the firm closer to its
optimal level.
3.2 Schooling/Saving Decisions
In our framework, schooling and savings are investments into two different assets (human
and physical capital). Our timing assumption allows us to characterize different investment
opportunities in terms of simple non-arbitrage equations that transpire from the first-order
optimality conditions for problems (Pw) and (Pe) with respect to s, e, and q. Financial
8 The expressions for A and B (q) can be found in Appendix A.
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frictions will later on be represented as wedges distorting these conditions.
The first-order conditions read:9
−µ+ w
(
l¯ + ψh− ψ (1− s) ηξh
s
)
u′ (c) = β
∑
z′,x′
pi (z′, x′|z, x) v1 (ω′, z′, x′)ω′2 (q, h, x) ηξ
h
s
(19)(
1− wψ (1− s) (1− η) ξh
e
)
u′ (c) = β
∑
z′,x′
pi (z′, x′|z, x) v1 (ω′, z′, x′)ω′2 (q, h, x) (1− η) ξ
h
e
(20)
−ν + 1
1 + r
u′ (c) = β
∑
z′,x′
pi (z′, x′|z, x) v1 (ω′, z′, x′)ω′1 (q, h, x) , (21)
where µ and ν are the Lagrange multipliers on the time constraint (5) and the borrowing
constraint (6), respectively. These equations apply conditional on either occupation, only the
partial derivatives of future wealth with respect to saving and human capital, respectively
ω′1 and ω
′
2, differ across worker and entrepreneur households.
Combining (19) and (20) allows us to obtain unconstrained schooling time as an implicit
function sˆ(e, z, w) of schooling expenditures,
w
(
l¯ + ψh
)
=
η
1− η
e
sˆ
,
where sˆ is strictly increasing in e. Schooling time is
s (e, z, w) = min {sˆ(e, z, w), s¯} , (22)
yielding human capital
h(e, z, w) = z
(
s(e, z, w)ηe1−η
)ξ
. (23)
Combining (20), (21), and (23) gives us a non-arbitrage condition equating the returns to
9Notice that v1 is always defined at the optimum. Even though v has a kink in the wealth dimension
induced by the occupational choice, the optimum will never occur at this kink. It follows that, at the
optimum, v1 is either equal to v
w
1 or to v
e
1. Notice also that, with sufficient smoothness introduced by the
ability shocks, which we assume, the first-order conditions are not only necessary but also sufficient for an
optimum. See Clausen and Strub (2013) for a formal discussion.
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physical and human capital accumulation:
− ν˜ + (1− η) ξh(e, z, w)
e
ω′2 (q, h (e, z, w) , x) = (1 + r) pe(h, s, e)ω
′
1 (q, h (z, e) , x) , (24)
where for convenience we denote the shadow unit price of schooling expenditures to be
pe = pe(h, s, e) ≡ 1− wψ (1− s(e, z, w)) (1− η) ξh(e, z, w)
e
, (25)
as it equals the unit of foregone consumption less the marginal increase in first-period earn-
ings, and ν˜ ≡ ν (1 + r) pe/(β
∑
z′,x′ pi (z
′, x′|z, x) v1 (ω′, z′, x′)). Specializing equation (24) for
each occupation allows us to characterize the optimal schooling decisions for worker and
entrepreneur households.10
3.2.1 Worker-Household
For a worker-household we have
ω′1 (q, h, x) = 1 and ω
′
2 (q, h, x) = w. (26)
As workers, all individuals have the same constant returns to human capital accumulation
since wages are linear in worker’s human capital. If the borrowing constraint does not
bind (q < −λφω and ν˜ = 0), then we can substitute (26) in (24) and optimal schooling
expenditures solve:
w
1 + r
(1− η) ξh
e
= pe, (27)
with h = h(e, z, w) and s = s(e, z, w). The left-hand-side is the discounted future benefit
of investing an extra unit of the final good on education, which is the wage rate times the
marginal increase in human capital. The right-hand-side is the marginal cost, which is the
unit of the good invested less the marginal increase in labor earnings enjoyed in the current
10A sufficient condition for the existence of an optimal solution is that θ1−γ (1− η)ξ < 1, which we assume
throughout. This condition always holds for worker households, who have linear returns on human capital
(equivalent to setting θ = 1−γ in the condition). For entrepreneur households it is automatically satisfied if,
for example, the entrepreneurial production function (3) has constant returns to scale in all variable inputs,
i.e. θ = 1 − γ. Increasing returns are admissible as long as the human capital accumulation technology
exhibits sufficient curvature.
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period.11
If instead the borrowing constraint binds (q = −λφω and ν˜ > 0), then the worker-
household’s optimal expenditure solves:
max
e
{
u
(
ω − e− w (sl¯ − ψh (1− s))+ 1
1 + r
λφω
)
+ β
∑
z′,x′
pi (z′, x′|z, x) v (wh− λφω, z′, x′)
}
(28)
where s = s(e) and h = h(z, e) are given respectively by (22) and (23). In contrast to
the unconstrained case, the optimal schooling expenditures of a credit-constrained worker-
household depends on current wealth ω.
3.2.2 Entrepreneur-Household
The capital constraint (9), together with the condition that k ≥ 0, implies that entrepreneur-
households will always have q > 0 and therefore will never be credit-constrained. We have:
ω′1 (q, h, x) =
1 +
∂Πc
∂q
(q, h, x) if q ∈ (0, q∗ (h, x)) ,
1 if q ≥ q∗ (h, x) ,
(29)
and
ω′2 (q, h, x) =
B (q)
θ
αγ+1−γ
(
xhθ
) 1
αγ+1−γ h−1 if q ∈ (0, q∗ (h, x)) ,
A θ
1−γ
(
xhθ
) 1
1−γ h−1 if q ≥ q∗ (h, x) .
(30)
From (29) and (30) we can deduce how the marginal returns to physical and human capital
accumulation vary with the entrepreneur-household’s saving q. We obtain the following
result.
Proposition 1. Given h, capital-constrained entrepreneur-households (with q < q∗ (x, h))
face a higher marginal return to physical capital accumulation and a lower marginal return to
human capital accumulation than unconstrained entrepreneur-households (with q ≥ q∗ (x, h)).
11This condition also characterizes human capital investment decisions of unconstrained individuals (work-
ers) in Erosa et al. (2010). Our paper draws attention to the impact of financial frictions on the education
decisions of entrepreneur-households.
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Proof. The first part of the proposition follows from (29), the fact that ∂Π
c(q,h,x)
∂q
is decreasing
in q, and that ∂Π
c
∂q
(q∗ (h, x) , h, x) = 0. The second part follows from (30), the fact that B (q)
is increasing in q, and that B (q∗ (h, x)) θ
αγ+1−γ
(
xhθ
) 1
αγ+1−γ = A θ
1−γ
(
xhθ
) 1
1−γ .
The intuition behind the first part of Proposition 1 is that, for capital-constrained
entrepreneur-households, saving relaxes the capital constraint and allows them to expand
their firms closer to the optimal unconstrained scale. The second part holds because human
and physical capital are complementary in production. Capital-constrained entrepreneur-
households employ less capital, making their human capital less productive.
Proposition 1 shows how the capital constraint distorts saving and schooling decisions of
entrepreneur-households. These households have an incentive to save more and invest less
in education compared to unconstrained entrepreneur-households.
Substituting ω′1 and ω
′
2 for the case of q ≥ q∗ (h, x) into (24) yields the condition for
optimal schooling expenditures of capital-unconstrained entrepreneur-households:
A
1 + r
(1− η) ξ θ
1− γ
(
xhθ
) 1
1−γ
e
= pe.
This condition is analogous to (27), with the left-hand side representing now the discounted
marginal increase in future profits from investing an additional unit of the final good on
schooling.
Analogously, we may replace ω′1 and ω
′
2 for the case of q ∈ (0, q∗ (h, x)) into (24) to obtain
the optimal schooling expenditures for capital-constrained entrepreneur-households:
B (q)
1 + r
(1− η) ξ θ
αγ + 1− γ
(
xhθ
) 1
αγ+1−γ
e
= pe
(
1 +
∂Πc
∂q
(q, h, x)
)
.
Compared to the unconstrained case, the marginal gain from investing in education is lower,
and decreasing returns set in faster (Proposition 1). The marginal cost is also higher, since
investing in education sacrifices wealth accumulation, which lowers firm capital and hence
profits. Optimal spending in education therefore depends on household wealth, via saving
q. Higher wealth helps relax the capital constraint, and reduces investment and schooling
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distortions.
4 Calibration
We focus on the comparison between the U.S. and India. Our baseline strategy is similar
to Buera and Shin’s (2013), in the sense that we first calibrate the model economy to the
U.S. and then vary the financial friction λ, holding the remaining parameters constant, in
order to match India’s ratio of external finance to output. We call this the benchmark India
calibration.
We consider an alternative schooling calibration where we also allow the mean of the
learning ability distribution, z¯, to vary between the U.S and India, in order to match In-
dia’s average years of schooling. The purpose if this exercise is to ask how far we go in
accounting for the U.S.-India differences in production outcomes, namely TFP, assuming
we are able to account for schooling differences. We view cross-country differences in z¯ as
representing differences in schooling quality not captured by current private expenditures.
These could be due to differences in public school quality, or differences in private or public
school infrastructure.
Our baseline parameters are described in Table 1. The first-order Markov chain governing
abilities is obtained from the discretization of a VAR(1) in logs where
ln (zt+1/z¯) = ρz (zt/z¯) + ε
z
t+1,
ln (xt+1/x¯) = ρx (xt/x¯) + ε
x
t+1,
and the disturbances are normally distributed with variance-covariance matrix
Σ =
 σ2z σzx
σzx σ
2
x
 .
We employ the procedure described by Tauchen and Hussey (1991), with 15 states for en-
trepreneurial ability and 4 states for learning ability.
We take one model period to be 30 years. Individuals start life at age 6. The period going
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from age 6 until age 36 (childhood) is when schooling and early working in the labor market
take place. The period going from age 36 until retirement age 66 (adulthood) is when the
main economic activity, entrepreneurship or working for a wage, takes place.
Some parameters are calibrated externally to the model. These are in the top block of
Table 1. We normalize average entrepreneurial ability to 1. The coefficient of relative risk
aversion belongs to the interval of available estimates, and is a standard value in quantitative
analysis, as is the rate of physical capital depreciation. The parameters governing the income
share of capital (α) and the income share of entrepreneurial income (γ) are also standard
in models of entrepreneurship (see for example Atkeson and Kehoe, 2005, Restuccia and
Rogerson, 2008, and Buera and Shin, 2013).12 We set the autocorrelation coefficient of
learning ability to the intergenerational correlation coefficient of IQ scores reported by Bowles
and Gintis (2002), between the average parental IQ score and the average offspring IQ score.
Finally, we impose an upper bound on schooling time corresponding to 20 years of formal
schooling.
The remaining 14 parameters are chosen in order to minimize the sum of squared per-
centage deviations of 14 data moments from their model analogues. The bottom block of
Table 1 shows the values for these parameters, as well as the model’s success in matching
the data moments. As is common in this type of analysis, we identify each parameter with
a moment which we believe is particularly helpful in identifying it, although in the end all
parameters are jointly determined through a fairly complex system of nonlinear equations.
When computing the moments in the model, we take into consideration the overlapping
generations structure of our framework, and the fact that young household members split
their time endowment between formal schooling and work. Specifically, we assume a survey
protocol in our model in which agents report information only at the end of each model
period. In this case, individuals reporting to be workers in the model are all young household
members, irrespective of their future occupation, plus adult household members who chose
to work for a wage during the second period of their lives. Individuals reporting to be
12In our model with decreasing returns to scale income accrues to capital, labor, and the entrepreneurial
input. We attribute the latter to capital and labor incomes, in shares α and 1−α respectively. We therefore
equate α to the aggregate capital income share value.
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Table 1: Benchmark calibration
Parameter Value Target Data Model
External calibration
σ 1.0 direct estimates
δ 0.844 yearly depreciation rate of 6%
α 1/3 capital income share
x¯ 1.0 normalization
γ 0.85 direct estimates
ρz 0.72 intergenerational correlation of IQ scores
s¯ 2/3 up to 20 years of formal schooling (ages 6-26)
Internal calibration
β 0.215 yearly real interest rate 0.04 0.037
z¯ 51.6 average years of schooling among entrepreneurs 13.9 13.6
ξ 0.85 average years of schooling among workers 13.7 14.2
σz 0.09 earnings share of top 5% 0.35 0.32
η 0.81 output share of schooling expenditures 0.045 0.047
l¯ 7.09 output share of teacher and staff compensation 0.05 0.046
ψ 0.6 average labor earnings at age 46 over average at age 26 1.75 1.75
θ 0.16 entrepreneurship rate 0.096 0.05
ρx 0.45 intergenerational correlation of entrepreneurship 0.32 0.29
σx 0.25 employment share of top 5% establishments 0.57 0.51
σxz -0.1 ratio of median earnings (entrepreneurial over labor) 0.94 1.0
φ 0.005 share of household credit in total external finance 0.19 0.21
λU.S. 9.22 ratio of external finance to output 2.91 2.25
λIndia 1.30 ratio of external finance to output 0.46 0.45
entrepreneurs are only adult household members who chose this occupation.13 We also take
one entrepreneurial firm in the model as corresponding to an establishment in the data.
We comment on each of the moments we have selected. A yearly real interest rate of 4%
is roughly between the real return on riskless bonds and the real return on equity over a long
horizon. Based on CPS (Current Population Survey) data, Levine and Rubinstein (2015)
report three relevant summary statistics: a rate of entrepreneurship (fraction of individuals
reporting to be self-employed) of 9.6%, average years of schooling of both entrepreneurs and
13For example, this implies that the rate of entrepreneurship in the model equals 1/2
∫
B
dΨ, where the
division by 2 arises because, every period, each household is endowed with two time endowments of one unit
each.
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workers around 14, and a ratio between the median annual earnings among entrepreneurs
to the median across workers of 0.9402.14 This moment is key at identifying a slightly nega-
tive covariance between innovations to learning and entrepreneurial abilities. Meaning that
households with high learning ability tend to have a slight disadvantage at entrepreneur-
ship. A higher covariance would imply a larger earnings ratio for entrepreneurs over workers
compared to the data.
For the output share of (public and private) schooling expenditures we use the same
number as Manuelli and Seshadri (2014), and for the output share of teacher and staff com-
pensation we use the same number as Erosa et al. (2010). The ratio of average labor earnings
at age 46 over the ratio at age 26 comes from Figure 1 of Kambourov and Manovskii (2009).
It is based upon the PSID (Panel Study of Income Dynamics) and refers to the cohort
entering the labor market in 1968. The intergenerational correlation of entrepreneurial occu-
pation is reported by Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000), and corresponds to the fraction of sons
of self-employed fathers in the NLS (National Longitudinal Surveys) who were themselves
self-employed at some point in the sample.
The employment share of the top 5% establishments is reported by Henly and Sanchez
(2009), based upon the U.S. Census County Business Pattern series. This figure is across
establishments in all sectors of activity in the year 2006. The number for the earnings share
of the top 5% comes from Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2011) and is based on the Survey of Consumer
Finances.
The ratio of total external finance (including private credit) to output in the U.S. is
obtained from the 2013 update of the Beck et al. (2000) financial indicators database. We
adjust the reported stock market capitalization by the average book-to-market ratio, follow-
ing Buera et al. (2011). Our number is the average over the years 1990-2011. Our other
financial market indicator is the share of household credit in total external financing. We
obtained this value as the product between the share of household credit in total credit in
2005 from the International Monetary Fund (2006), and the share of total credit in total
external financing from the 2013 update of the Beck et al. (2000) data set, again averaged
14Levine and Rubinstein (2015) also report a ratio of average annual earnings between the two occupations
of 1.25, indicating a significantly more skewed earnings distribution among entrepreneurs. Our model is
consistent with this fact.
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over the years 1990-2011.
Finally, in our schooling calibration we obtain λIndia = 1.27, and z¯India = 14.13, which is
about one quarter of the U.S. value. With these parameters, we are able to exactly match
India’s ratio of external finance to output of 0.46, and India’s average years of schooling of
5.26.
5 Results
5.1 Allocative Consequences of Financial Constraints
We begin with a qualitative analysis of the allocative effects of financial frictions. In the
absence of frictions, the wealth distribution should play no role in resource allocation, which
should depend only on the distribution of abilities. With financial frictions, the wealth
distribution interferes with resource allocation. We illustrate the different types of distortions
that arise in the model economy. We plot some of the model’s decision rules, for the U.S.
and India (benchmark calibration), at each time varying one of the states while holding the
remaining two constant. Our focus is on household-entrepreneurs.
5.1.1 Misallocation of Talent
The occupational choice is displayed in Figure 1. The left panel shows that low wealth
makes some ability types in India choose to become workers, whereas they engage in en-
trepreneurship in the U.S. This is because financial constraints are tighter in India. The
right panel shows that, both in the U.S. and in India, only individuals with sufficiently high
entrepreneurial ability become entrepreneurs. However, the entrepreneurial ability cutoff is
lower in India. Since input prices are lower in India (general equilibrium effect) this en-
courages some of the marginal ability types to become entrepreneurs. No selection effects
are evidenced in the middle panel for learning ability, an outcome which is specific to the
particular state we are looking at.
Figure 1 illustrates two forces underlying the misallocation of talent in the economy:
financial frictions discourage some good types from becoming entrepreneurs in India, whereas
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Figure 1: Entrepreneurship rate across ability and wealth
they encourage some bad types to engage in this activity. The resulting selection of types
into entrepreneurship is worse in India.
In net terms, the effect of attracting bad types into entrepreneurship dominates the effect
of discouraging good types, and the entrepreneurship rate is higher in India (6.5%) compared
to the U.S. (5%).
5.1.2 Production Distortions
Figure 2a displays the level of production depending on the current entrepreneurial state.
The left panel shows that, for sufficiently rich individuals, production is independent from
wealth. For them, production is higher in India because input prices are lower. Among
poorer individuals, instead, production declines with wealth. This happens at a faster rate
in India, where financial constraints are tighter. Tighter constraints lower production both
because firm size is lower, but also because firm-level productivity xhθ is lower. The latter
is due to the fact that entrepreneurs under-invest in education. For the very poorest, these
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effects lead to output losses in India compared to the U.S.
The middle and right panels of Figure 2a show that, for given wealth, production in-
creases with both learning and entrepreneurial abilities. However, they increase at a faster
pace in the U.S. As ability levels increase, constraints become tighter, particularly in India.
When ability is higher, entrepreneurs in India are constrained to make more significant size
reductions relative to the optimum, and sacrifice schooling more, resulting in lower firm-level
productivity.
The behavior of capital-output ratios in Figure 2b is consistent with this discussion. Capi-
tal drops relative to output when entrepreneurs are constrained, which happens particulary in
India, and relatively poor and high-ability individuals. Absent financial constraints, capital-
output ratios should be independent from wealth, as well as from learning or entrepreneurial
ability.
Notice that endogenous schooling works to mitigate some of the effects of credit con-
straints on production. Although higher ability households do tend to be more credit-
constrained, in our model they are able to respond by sacrificing schooling investments.
This allows them to accumulate more wealth thereby relaxing credit constraints. Capital-
output ratios do not decline as much as they would otherwise, without schooling responses,
and production distortions tend to be lower.15 We illustrate these schooling responses next.
5.1.3 Investment Distortions
We display the saving and schooling expenditure decisions of entrepreneurs, as a function of
wealth, in Figure 3a. For sufficiently wealthy households, saving increases with wealth, and
is higher in the U.S. because of a higher interest rate. As wealth diminishes, at some point
the constraint on capital tomorrow will bind (the kink in the saving decision rule). This
arises earlier in India compared to the U.S., given tighter constraints in India. At this point,
in order to build more collateral, entrepreneurs save more today than they would normally
do.
The right panel of Figure 3a illustrates the under-investment in schooling by constrained
15This feature is related to Midrigan and Xu (2014), who emphasize the role of self-financing in mitigating
the effect of credit frictions on capital misallocation. Our setup allows for self-financing to adjust to frictions
not only through declines in current consumption, but also in schooling.
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Figure 2: Production and capital-output ratios across ability and wealth
entrepreneurs. In sufficiently wealthy households, schooling depends only on learning and
entrepreneurial abilities, not on wealth. Expenditure levels are higher in India, once again
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Figure 3: Saving and schooling expenditures of entrepreneurs
because of lower input prices: optimal firm size is higher in India for these individuals,
increasing the marginal return to education. Among poorer households, however, schooling
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declines with wealth. This happens both because of a lower marginal return to schooling
investments, and a higher opportunity cost. Constrained entrepreneurs would rather build
collateral than spend on education.
Figure 3b gives some further indication of how financial frictions distort saving and school-
ing decisions. Both in the U.S. and in India, schooling increases with learning ability. How-
ever, the slope of the profile is higher in the U.S. In this country, as learning ability increases,
entrepreneurs are willing to cut back on saving and devote more resources to schooling, see
right panel of Figure 3b. Not the case in India, where higher learning ability also means a
tighter constraint on firm size, leading entrepreneurs not only to increase schooling expen-
ditures by less, but also to actually increase saving. All of this in an attempt to build more
collateral for the next period and relax frictions.
5.2 Measuring Misallocation
We rely on the framework of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) to gauge the extent of misallocation
in our model. That is, we will capture the extent of model-driven production and investment
distortions by means of generic distortions affecting a simple stand-in firm decision problem.
In broad terms, our strategy follows in two steps. First, we show that the generic pro-
duction distortions considered by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) do have a specific interpretation
in terms of our model. Second, we use and extend Hsieh and Klenow’s (2009) framework to
decompose the extent of model-based TFP differences in terms of average firm-level produc-
tivity and input misallocation effects.
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) focus on revenue productivity (TFPR) as a measurement tool,
following Foster et al. (2008). This notion of total factor productivity is obtained by dividing
nominal production revenue by an appropriate measure of production inputs. As Hsieh
and Klenow (2009) show, the distribution of TFPR across production units is particularly
informative about misallocation. In the benchmark case of no frictions, this distribution
is degenerate, as TFPR reflects only factors which are common across production units,
such as market prices and common technological parameters. Importantly, TFPR does not
reflect differences in real, or physical productivity across units (TFPQ in the literature’s
terminology), it only reflects unit-specific deviations from marginal product equalization. As
25
we shall show, under some conditions a more dispersed TFPR distribution is associated with
a higher the degree of misallocation frictions. A more dispersed TFPR distribution indicates
larger TFP gains may be obtained by reallocating the existing aggregate level of production
inputs away from low and towards high TFPR firms.
Our first goal is precisely to compute model-based distributions of TFPQ and TFPR in
order to characterize firm-level productivity and input misallocation effects in the production
sector. Our approach provides an explicit mapping between TFPQ and TFPR, and deeper
financial frictions.
5.2.1 Basic Model Wedges
Financial frictions distort decisions by introducing what amounts to individual-level wedges
in the optimality conditions that would emerge in the frictionless case. We call them basic
distortions, or basic model wedges. We first identify these basic wedges, and then show
how they map into proxy, or stand-in misallocation wedges. The latter are generic wedges
featured in much of the misallocation literature, for example Restuccia and Rogerson (2008),
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Bartelsman et al. (2013), among many others. Since our focus
is on production distortions, we shall concentrate on entrepreneur-households.
The entrepreneur-household’s optimality conditions under frictions (Section 3.2) can be
re-written as their counterpart absent frictions, distorted by two basic individual-level wedges
which we label τ eq and τ
e
h:
u′ (c) = β (1 + r)
(
1 + τ eq
)∑
z′,x′
pi (z′, x′|z, x) v1 (ω′, z′, x′) , (31)
peu
′ (c) = β (1− η) ξ (1− τ eh)
θ
1− γA
(
xhθ
) 1
1−γ
e
∑
z′,x′
pi (z′, x′|z, x) v1 (ω′, z′, x′) . (32)
These equations define two basic wedges for the entrepreneur-household as a function of
the current state. These wedges capture distortions to the marginal value of future wealth
of additional saving and human capital levels due to the presence of financial constraints,
as described by (29) and (30). They replicate the optimality conditions (20) and (21) for
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constrained entrepreneurs provided that
τ eq =
 ∂Πc (q, h, x) /∂q if q ∈ (0, q∗ (h, x)),0 if q ≥ q∗ (h, x),
τ eh =
 1−
B(q)
A
1−γ
αγ+1−γ
(
xhθ
)− αγ
(1−γ)(αγ+1−γ) if q ∈ (0, q∗ (h, x)),
0 if q ≥ q∗ (h, x).
The wedge τ eq ≥ 0 acts like a subsidy to saving, capturing the fact that whenever the
capital constraint binds, an increase in saving today relaxes the constraint and increases
profits tomorrow. That is, for constrained entrepreneurs, ∂Π
c
∂q
(q, h, x) > 0.
The wedge τ eh ∈ [0, 1] acts like a tax on the returns to schooling, capturing the fact that
human capital is less productive for constrained entrepreneurs. This is because physical
capital is lower, and complementary to human capital.
Notice that, relative to the economy without frictions, individual decisions in the econ-
omy with frictions are affected not only by the presence of distortions but also by general
equilibrium price effects.
5.2.2 Production Wedges
We now recast the firm’s problem as in Hsieh and Klenow (2009). We call it the proxy firm
problem:
Π = max
k,l≥0
{
(1− τa) px (h∗)θ
(
kαl1−α
)γ − (1 + τk) (r + δ) k − wl} , (Pf′)
where h∗ is the human capital level that would emerge absent financial frictions (but still
subject to the prices under frictions), and p is the output price, which may be normalized to
1 in our setup.
We label τa and τk individual-level proxy wedges, in the sense that they are generic wedges
standing-in for the fundamental distortions affecting the economy. τa captures distortions
along the potential revenue (i.e. revenue based on potential productivity x(h∗)θ) vs cost
margin, whereas τk captures distortions along the capital vs labor input cost margin. Our
task is now to infer proxy wedges from basic wedges. The proxy firm problem (Pf′) yields
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the same solution as the original firm problem (Pf) when
1− τa =
(
h
h∗
)θ
1 + τk = 1 +
ζ
r + δ
,
where ζ is the multiplier on the capital constraint.
It is possible to uncover an explicit mapping between proxy and basic distortions. Ap-
plying the Envelope theorem and using the definition of τ eq :
1 + τk = 1 +
τ eq
λ (r + δ)
.
A mapping between τa and basic distortions obtains in closed form when ψ = 0. In this
case pe = 1 and, further assuming that the time constraint is slack, optimal schooling time
s is proportional to expenditures e. Combining (31) and (32) under the constrained and the
unconstrained cases, we obtain
1− τa =
(
1− τ eh
1 + τ eq
) θξ
1− ξθ1−γ ,
where ξθ < 1− γ given our parametric assumptions.
These expressions allow us to interpret the two proxy wedges in terms of our financial
frictions model. First, τk ≥ 0 amounts to a tax on capital. The reason is that the capital
constraint increases the shadow rental price of capital. Second, τa ∈ [0, 1] amounts to a
reduction in a firm’s physical output. The reason is that the capital constraint decreases
actual firm-level productivity xhθ below potential, by discouraging entrepreneurial school-
ing investments. The total disincentive to investing in human capital is captured by the
composite distortion (1− τ eh)/(1 + τ eq ). This composite distortion amounts to a positive tax
since (i) capital-constrained entrepreneurs run smaller firms, reducing the returns to invest-
ing in human capital, and (ii) for these households, accumulating wealth relaxes the capital
constraint, and therefore commands a higher return compared to investing in human capital.
An alternative parametric case useful considering is for l¯ = 0 (and ψ > 0), assuming
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again a slack time constraint. We obtain
1− τa =
(
1− τ eh
1 + τ eq
) 1−(θ−η)ξ
θξ(1−γ)
(
p∗e
pe
) 1−(θ−η)ξ
θξ(1−γ)
, (33)
where p∗e is the shadow unit price of schooling expenditures ignoring credit constraints.
Although a closed form is not available, this formulation illustrates the role of schooling
expenditure prices in amplifying the effect of the composite distortion on τa, especially for
individuals with low learning ability z, or in countries with low z¯. Recall from (25) that pe
equals one unit of the final good net of the increase in first-period earnings afforded by the
additional human capital. Individuals with lower first-period earnings (lower z) tend to have
higher pe, and especially higher p
∗
e. The higher p
∗
e/pe faced by these individuals captures
the fact that schooling investments are particularly expensive for them, as they are less
productive in generating first-period resources potentially available for building up collateral
for the second-period entrepreneurial activity. This amplification mechanism is present in
our general formulation, and will play a key role when comparing economies with different
z¯.
The production technology underlying the stand-in problem (Pf′) is y ≡
(1− τa)x (h∗)θ (kαl1−α)γ. We follow Hsieh and Klenow (2009) in defining a firm’s (actual)
physical productivity TFPQ and revenue productivity TFPR as16
TFPQ ≡ y
(kαl1−α)γ
= (1− τa)x (h∗)θ
TFPR ≡ py
kαl1−α
.
16Notice that although the wedge τa looks similar to the revenue distortion τy of Hsieh and Klenow (2009),
it plays a different role in our setting. Unlike τy in Hsieh and Klenow (2009), τa is a wedge between potential
and actual physical productivity. It does not act as a pure revenue tax, representing instead the physical
productivity effects of lower schooling investments. For this reason, τa is part of the definition of TFPQ,
whereas τy would be part of the definition of TFPR, as in Hsieh and Klenow (2009). In terms of our model,
in fact, there are no revenue distortions as defined by Hsieh and Klenow (2009).
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The optimality conditions are
γ(1− α)
(
k
l
)α
TFPR = w
γα
(
k
l
)α−1
TFPR = (1 + τk) (r + δ) ,
and so
k
l
=
α
1− α
w
(1 + τk) (r + δ)
.
Revenue productivity is therefore
TFPR ∝ (1 + τk)α .
Absent frictions, τ eq = τ
e
h = 0 and e = e
∗. Therefore τa = τk = 0. In this case the
distribution of TFPR is degenerate, and the distribution of TFPQ reflects only individual
heterogeneity in abilities among households selecting into entrepreneurship. With frictions,
we expect the distribution of TFPR to become more dispersed, reflecting greater physical
capital misallocation, and the distribution of TFPQ to shift to the left, reflecting lower levels
of entrepreneurial human capital for constrained entrepreneurs.
Figure 4 plots the distributions of TFPR and TFPQ in our model, for both the U.S. and
the India (benchmark) calibrations. The degree of production misallocation in the economy
with frictions is large. The standard deviation of log TFPR more than doubles from the
U.S. to India. The mean of the TFPQ distribution is 10% smaller in India, and is also more
dispersed.
The next section will provide an explicit link between aggregate productivity and the
moments of the TFPR and TFPQ distributions.
5.3 Misallocation and Aggregate Productivity
The final good sector admits an aggregate production function in our setting (see Appendix
B):
Y = TFP
(
KαL1−α
)γ
,
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Figure 4: Revenue and physical productivity distributions
where Y ≡ ∫
B
ydΨ, K ≡ ∫
B
kdΨ, and L ≡ ∫
B
ldΨ, and total factor productivity (TFP) is
an aggregator of individual physical productivities and distortions
TFP ≡
∫
B
(
x (h∗)θ 1−τa
(1+τk)
αγ
) 1
1−γ
dΨ[∫
B
(
x (h∗)θ 1−τa
(1+τk)
1−γ+αγ
) 1
1−γ
dΨ
]αγ [∫
B
(
x (h∗)θ 1−τa
(1+τk)
αγ
) 1
1−γ
dΨ
](1−α)γ .
Defining
TFPR′ ≡ TFPR (1 + τk)α(γ−1) ∝ (1 + τk)αγ
we can rewrite aggregate TFP as
TFP =
∫
B
(
TFPQ
TFPR
′
TFPR′
) 1
1−γ
dΨ, (34)
where TFPR
′
is a geometric average of average marginal products of capital and labor.17,18
17The presence of decreasing returns to scale in production (γ < 1) introduces a slight difference between
TFPR and the weights on TFPQ in the expression for TFP , which we define as TFPR′. The two quantities
behave very similarly though.
18TFPR
′ ≡
{[∫
B
(
TFPQ
TFPR′
) 1
1−γ 1
1+τk
dΨ
]α [∫
B
(
TFPQ
TFPR′
) 1
1−γ
dΨ
]1−α}γ(1−γ)
κ1−γ , with
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Expression (34) is identical to the one obtained in Hsieh and Klenow’s (2009) accounting
framework. We extend their framework by considering distortions impacting firm-level phys-
ical productivity (τa).
To better understand the impact of distortions on aggregate TFP it is instructive to
consider the case in which x (h∗)θ, (1− τa), and (1 + τk) are jointly log-normally distributed
among firms. The logarithm of aggregate TFP can then be written as a function of a few
key moments of the joint distribution of firm-level wedges and potential productivities:
log TFP = (1− γ) log ent+(1− γ) log EB
[
TFPQ
1
1−γ
]
−1
2
αγ (1− γ + αγ)
1− γ varB (log TFPR) ,
(35)
where ent ≡ ∫
B
1 dΨ is the measure of the set of entrepreneur-households, and the expecta-
tion and the variance are conditional on the states in this set.
This expression is very similar to the one obtained by Hsieh and Klenow (2009), their
equation (16), with two differences. First, since γ = 1 in their baseline case, the first term
is absent. Second, and more importantly, in their case the TFPQ distribution is exogenous.
Here it is itself a function of the degree of financial frictions, through the response of schooling
investments. This response entails an amplification of the aggregate productivity effects of
financial frictions, which go beyond capital misallocation.
The first term in equation (35) is the TFP gain from specialization. Since firm-level
technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale, aggregate productivity rises when output
is produced by a larger number of smaller firms. The other two terms in equation (35) il-
lustrate two channels through which firm-level distortions reduce the aggregate TFP. First,
τa decreases the average firm-level physical productivity, by introducing a gap between po-
tential actual (TFPQ) and potential physical productivities (x (h∗)θ). This effect is due to
lower human capital investments by the entrepreneur-households in face of financial frictions.
Second, dispersion in τk reduces aggregate TFP by introducing dispersion in marginal prod-
ucts of capital across firms, which is the effect traditionally emphasized by the misallocation
literature.19
κ ≡ 1γ
(
w
1−α
)1−α (
r+δ
α
)α
.
19Notice that, unlike TFPQ, the average level of TFPR does not impact TFP . Intuitively, if all firms
have the same gap between input prices and marginal products, aggregate productivity won’t increase by
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Decomposing further the second term in equation (35) allows us to identify five key
moments that determine the total effect of financial frictions on aggregate TFP
log TFP = (1− γ) log ent︸ ︷︷ ︸
Specialization
+ (1− γ) log EB
[
x (h∗)
θ
1−γ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Potential productivity
+ (1− γ) log EB
[
(1− τa)
1
1−γ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Schooling under-investment
+
1
1− γ covB
(
log
(
x (h∗)θ
)
, log (1− τa)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Schooling misallocation
− 1
2
αγ (1− γ + αγ)
1− γ varB (log (1 + τk))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Capital misallocation
.
(36)
The first and the last terms are once more the specialization gain and physical capital
misallocation effects. The total effect on firm-level productivity EB
[
TFPQ
1
1−γ
]
is now de-
composed into three components. The potential productivity term is determined by the
selection of households into entrepreneurship, and thus by the misallocation of talent. In
addition, it also reflects changes in entrepreneurial human capital investment due to changes
in prices. The schooling under-investment term represents the effect of financial frictions
on entrepreneur-household investments in human capital. As this term shows, the average
level of schooling distortions τa matters for aggregate TFP.
20 The schooling misallocation
term stems from the interaction between selection into entrepreneurship and human capital
investments of entrepreneur-households. A negative covariance between x (h∗)θ and (1− τa)
decreases aggregate TFP, since in this case entrepreneurs with the highest potential firm-level
productivities face the largest distortions. In other words, the most talented entrepreneurs
face the largest disincentive to invest in schooling, and therefore experience the largest pro-
ductivity declines relative to potential.
5.4 Aggregate Consequences of Financial Frictions
We now consider the aggregate consequences of frictions in the model, for the U.S. and the
two India calibrations, benchmark (when only λ differs from the U.S.) and schooling (when
reallocating a given level of aggregate capital across firms.
20This contrasts with Hsieh and Klenow’s (2009) framework, where only the dispersion and not the level of
(revenue plus capital) distortions matters for aggregate TFP, to the extent that dispersion in wedges induces
dispersion in marginal products.
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also z¯ differs, in order to match average years of schooling in India). Table 2 looks at the
implications for aggregate output, capital-output ratios, and aggregate TFP, both in the
model and in the data. Our data source is version 8.1 of the Penn World Tables (Feenstra
et al., 2013). Appendix C describes in detail the mapping of the aggregate production
function between model and data.
Y K/Y TFP
Model Data Model Data Model Data
U.S. 1.00 1.00 2.21 2.99 1.00 1.00
India - bench 0.80
0.08
1.87
1.93
0.84
0.26
- school 0.07 1.95 0.57
Table 2: Macroeconomic aggregates
The model produces significant differences in these macroeconomic aggregates. The mag-
nitudes are smaller than what we see in the data for the benchmark (‘bench’) calibration, but
very close for the schooling (‘school’) calibration. Namely, under the benchmark calibration,
the model accounts for 22% of the 74 percent India-U.S. TFP difference, and for 22% of the
92 percent aggregate output difference. Under the schooling calibration, it accounts for 58%
of the TFP difference, and generates an output difference as large as in the data.21
Table 3 provides a decomposition of the TFP difference in line with equation (36). As
discussed previously, this decomposition is valid under a joint log-normality assumption.
This appears to be a good approximation, based on the fact that, as the bottom of Table 3
shows, the actual TFP difference (from Table 2) are reasonably close to the TFP difference
implied by equation (36).
According to this decomposition, the specialization term contributes negatively to the
U.S.-India TFP difference, since the entrepreneurship rate is higher in India. The other two
terms, firm-level productivity and physical capital misallocation, contribute each to about a
10% TFP difference under the benchmark calibration. The contribution of firm-level pro-
ductivity is further decomposed into three terms. Potential productivity is on average higher
21The reason the latter calibration delivers output differences in line with the data in spite of lower TFP
differences is that human capital stock differences turn out to be larger than the PWT8.1 estimates we rely
upon to compute TFP - see Appendix C - even if we do match average schooling years differences.
34
in India, since input prices are lower, in spite of a worse ability selection into entrepreneur-
ship. Lower input prices give incentives for unconstrained entrepreneurs to expand further
their production scale, and hence invest more in education. A lower interest also encourages
entrepreneurs to invest more in education, for given production scale. This term therefore
contributes negatively to the model’s U.S.-India TFP difference. However, schooling under-
investment is more important in India, contributing to a 5.2% loss in TFP relative to the
U.S. Finally, there is also a significantly higher degree of schooling misallocation in India
compared to the U.S. The most talented entrepreneurs in India are the ones cutting back
the most in terms of education, and this effect entails a 4% TFP loss.
The firm-level productivity effect is significantly larger under the schooling calibration,
accounting in this case for a 46% TFP loss in India. One of the main effects, not surpris-
ingly, comes from what is now a 22% loss in potential productivity. This is due to the
direct productivity effect of a lower z¯, compounded by lower schooling investments absent
frictions. The most interesting outcome is that frictions now play a much more significant
role. Schooling under-investment contributes to a TFP loss which is more than twice as
large, and schooling misallocation now entails a 21% TFP loss compared to the U.S.
The intuition behind these larger effects can be traced back to the discussion surround-
ing (33). The productivity of human capital investments in India is on average lower under
the schooling calibration. This effectively weakens the self-financing channel for future en-
trepreneurs, by lowering their first-period wage earnings. For given basic distortions, stem-
ming from the presence of financial frictions, a lower ability to raise first-period earnings
makes schooling investments more expensive. This mechanism amplifies schooling under-
investments in India, and generates individual-level productivity distortions τa which are
higher on average, as well as more dispersed across individuals.
Table 4 focuses on a few key micro-level features underlying production. It displays the
rate of entrepreneurship and the average firm size (relative to the U.S).
The rate of entrepreneurship in the U.S. comes again from Levine and Rubinstein (2015),
see Section 4. For India, we rely on the information provided in Table 6 of Mitra and Verick
(2013). They report a rate of self-employment for males aged 15-59 ranging from 41 percent
in urban settings to 53 percent in rural settings (years 2009-10). We focus on the average of
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TFP term % Loss India relative to U.S.
bench school
Specialization –0.072 –0.076
Firm-level productivity +0.093 +0.463
Potential productivity –0.004 +0.222
Schooling under-investment +0.052 +0.131
Schooling misallocation +0.039 +0.206
Physical capital misallocation +0.103 +0.092
Approximate TFP 0.127 0.476
Actual TFP 0.161 0.428
Table 3: Aggregate TFP loss decomposition
the two.
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Figure 5: Lorenz curves, model (straight line) vs data (dotted line)
In the data, our measure of size is the number of employees.22 Once again, we take the
data counterpart of an entrepreneurial firm in the model to be an establishment. For the
U.S., the evidence comes from Henly and Sanchez (2009), based on the Census Bureau’s 2006
County Business Pattern Series. They report an average of 15 employees per establishment
22We use the total firm-level labor input as the model counterpart. Unfortunately our model does not
distinguish between the number of workers and the quantity of human capital employed. To partially address
this issue, we equate the number of workers employed by a firm to l/h¯w, where h¯w is the average level of
human capital per worker in the whole economy.
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ent.rate avg. firm size
Model Data Model Data
U.S. 0.050 0.096 1.00 1.00
India - bench 0.080
0.470
0.73
0.29
- school 0.082 0.16
Table 4: Entrepreneurship rate and average firm size
across all sectors of activity (their Figure 1). For India, we rely on the Fifth Economic Census
by the Indian Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation, which concerns the year
2015.23 The data is available for all sectors of activity across all Indian states, in both urban
and rural settings. It provides the same type of information (i.e. establishment and worker
counts by establishment size groups) as the County Business Pattern Series in the U.S. This
allows us to apply the same method as Henly and Sanchez (2009) to obtain approximations
to the relevant moments of the size distribution in India from the establishment and worker
counts, and ensures comparability across the two countries.24 We obtain an average of 4.38
employees per establishment in India, which implies a India-U.S. ratio of 0.29 in the data.
Consistently with the data, our model generates more entrepreneurs in India, operating on
average at a smaller scale. The main mechanism driving the higher rate of entrepreneurship is
the drop in input prices, which encourages lower ability individuals to engage in production.
The magnitude is much lower than the one we obtain from the data.
The establishment-size distribution, both in the model and in the data, not only gets
shifted to the left in India, but also develops a more pronounced right skew: there is a
larger mass of very small firms in India. This pattern is illustrated in Figure 5 for the
benchmark calibration.25 As in the data, the smaller firms in India account for a larger
fraction of aggregate employment compared to the U.S. Overall, the model delivers firm-
size distribution differences which are consistent with the data, however the magnitudes
are smaller in the model. The model accounts for about one half of the 2/3 India-U.S.
23Freely available at http://mospi.nic.in.
24The mean establishment size can be calculated exactly from the establishment and worker counts. Higher-
order moments can be approximated by assuming a triangular distribution for the establishments inside each
size group. See Henly and Sanchez (2009).
25The Lorenz curves under the schooling calibration are qualitatively similar, however the gap between
model and data is larger.
37
aggregate workers entrepreneurs
Model Data Model Data Model Data
U.S. 14.16 13.70 14.21 13.70 13.60 13.90
India - bench 13.59
5.26
13.61
–
13.41
–
- school 5.26 5.41 3.61
Table 5: Schooling
difference in average firm size under the benchmark calibration, which gets overstated under
the schooling calibration.
Table 5 looks at average years of schooling. The U.S. data, both aggregate and by
occupation, are averages over 1996-2012 from the Current Population Survey as reported
by Levine and Rubinstein (2015). The Indian data is unfortunately only available for the
aggregate, and comes from Barro and Lee (2013). We use the reported average years of
schooling of the population older than 15 years over 1995-2010.
The model produces lower schooling levels in India independent of occupation, however
the magnitude is significantly lower than in the data under the benchmark calibration. One
reason the model is unable to deliver a larger effect is that the interest rate is lower in India,
which gives incentive for larger schooling investments in this country both among workers
and entrepreneurs.
The schooling calibration matches the average years of schooling in India by design, and
therefore produces much larger schooling responses across occupations as well. The effect is
more pronounced across entrepreneurs, highlighting the central mechanism of our model.
6 Concluding Remarks
We investigate the aggregate productivity effects of financial frictions, in an environment
where frictions impact both firm-level investment decisions, and household-level schooling
decisions. We show that, in anticipation of the effect credit constraints have on their future
business activity, entrepreneurs under-invest in schooling. Further, this behavior is more
pronounced among the most able entrepreneurs, generating a misallocation of schooling
investments. Both effects are shown to produce important aggregate productivity losses.
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We are able to account for about 1/5 of the U.S.-India aggregate productivity difference,
of which half is due to these effects. A calibration that matches the U.S.-India difference
in average years of schooling significantly amplifies the impact of financial frictions. In this
case the model accounts for 58% of the TFP differences.
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A Profit Functions
The profit functions are:
Π∗ (h, x) = A
(
xhθ
) 1
1−γ ,
Πc (q, h, x) = B (q)
(
xhθ
) 1
1−(1−α)γ − (r + δ)λq,
where
A =
[
A0
(
(1− α) (r + δ)
αw
)1−α]γ
(1− γ) ,
A0 =
[
(1− α) (r + δ)1− 1(1−α)γ
αw
](1−α) γ
1−γ
(αγ)
1
1−γ ,
B (q) = B0 (q
αγ)
1
1−(1−α)γ ,
B0 =
1− (1− α) γ
(1− α) γ w
[
(1− α) γλαγ
w
] 1
1−(1−α)γ
.
B Aggregation
The individual input demands from problem (Pf′) can be written as
l =
[
x (h∗)θ 1−τa
(1+τk)
αγ
] 1
1−γ
∫
B
[
x (h∗)θ 1−τa
(1+τk)
αγ
] 1
1−γ
dΨ
L ≡ $lL
k =
[
x (h∗)θ 1−τa
(1+τk)
1−γ(1−α)
] 1
1−γ
∫
B
[
x (h∗)θ 1−τa
(1+τk)
1−γ(1−α)
] 1
1−γ
dΨ
K ≡ $kK.
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Aggregate production is then
Y =
∫
B
ydΨ
=
∫
B
(1− τa)x (h∗)θ
(
kαl1−α
)γ
dΨ
= TFP
(
KαL1−α
)γ
where
TFP ≡
∫
B
(1− τa)x (h∗)θ$αγk $(1−α)γl dΨ.
C Mapping Between Model and Data
The aggregate production function in the data is
Y = TFP
(
KαL1−α
)γ
,
where L ≡ h`N is the total labor input, with h being human capital per worker, ` the
total number of workers per engaged person, and N the number of engaged persons (which
includes workers and the self-employed).
We proceed in a way analogous to the related literature employing decreasing returns to
scale technology (e.g. Buera and Shin, 2013) and abstract from scale effects. That is, we
treat the data as if N = 1 for both the U.S. and India, and rewrite the aggregate production
function in terms of (lowercase) variables per engaged person as
y = TFP
(
kα (h`)1−α
)γ
.
We rely on PWT8.1 data in order to back out TFP for the U.S. and India. We use data
for the year 2005 on current-year PPP-adjusted GDP per engaged person (variable CGDP o
divided by EMP ), capital stock per engaged person (CK/EMP ), and human capital stock
per engaged person (variable HC), together with our parameter values for α and γ. Human
capital stocks result from mapping average years of schooling from Barro and Lee (1993)
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through an exponential human capital technology specification as in Caselli (2005), using
returns to schooling specific to each schooling level.
We assume that human capital per worker h, which we do not observe in PWT8.1, equals
human capital per engaged person. The total labor input h` is then computed by equating
` to one minus the rate of entrepreneurship from Table 4.
D Numerical Algorithm
We solve the model using value function iteration.
1. Discretization: Discretize ω into {ω0, . . . , ωNω}. We choose the upper bound and
lower bounds such that increasing them further apart has a negligible effect on the
solution.
The VAR(1) process for abilities is discretized into a Markov chain using the procedure
described in Tauchen and Hussey (1991).
2. Occupational choice and production: Solve for ω′ (q, h, x) given the current guess
for prices w and r.
(i) Compute the threshold level of saving q∗ (h, x).
(ii) Compute profits Π (q, h, x).
(iii) Compute next generation’s wealth ω′ (q, h, x).
3. Saving and education: Solve for the decision rules e (ω, z, x), s (ω, z, x), and
q (ω, z, x), given ω′ (q, h, x) from step 2, and given the current guess for prices.
(i) Guess value function V j (ω, z, x) at gridpoints.
(ii) Solve for the right-hand-side of the Bellman equation:
V j+1 (ω, z, x) = max
c,e,s,q
{
u (c) + β
∑
z′,x′
pi (z′, x′|z, x)V j (ω′ (q, h, x) , z′, x′)
}
subject to (4)-(6).
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First try an interior solution for q. If q ≥ −λφω then the solution has been
found. Otherwise set q = −λφω and find s and e subject to this constraint. V j
is approximated by a piecewise linear function for future wealth levels outside of
the grid.
(iii) Iterate until V j (ω, z, x) ≈ V j+1 (ω, z, x).
4. Invariant distribution: Approximate by simulating a large cross-section of N +
1 agents over a sufficiently large number of T periods. Decision rules are linearly
interpolated over a very fine grid.
5. Market clearing: Check whether the labor and capital markets clear. Compute
excess demand for labor and capital from the invariant distribution as:
EDL (w, r) =
1
N
N+1∑
n=2
[
1n−1ln−1 + snl¯ − (1− 1n−1)hn−1 − (1− sn)ψhn
]
EDK (w, r) =
1
N
N+1∑
n=2
[
1n−1kn−1 − qn
1 + r
]
,
where 1n is an indicator which takes the value of 1 if household n chooses en-
trepreneurship and 0 otherwise. Iterate on market prices until EDL (w, r) ≈ 0 and
EDK (w, r) ≈ 0.
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